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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF “MATERIALITY” UNDER THE FALSE
CLAIMS ACT
JOHN T. BOESE*

“Words calculated to catch everyone may catch no one.”
—Adlai E. Stevenson II1

“The United States is a nation of laws: badly written and randomly
enforced.”
—Frank Zappa2
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most important debates in the jurisprudence of the civil False
Claims Act (“FCA”)3 has always been the question of materiality as a
necessary element for liability under the FCA.4 The questions have
traditionally revolved around:

* John T. Boese is Of Counsel in the Washington, D.C. office of Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver &
Jacobson LLP, where he was a partner for over 25 years. He represents a broad spectrum of
defendants in civil, criminal, debarment, and exclusion cases arising from federal fraud
investigations of government contractors and grantees, health care providers, and other
organizations. Mr. Boese is the author of the treatise CIVIL FALSE CLAIMS AND QUI TAM ACTIONS
(3d ed. 2006 & Supp. 2010-1). The statements herein do not necessarily represent the
position of the author’s Firm or clients of the Firm and should not be imputed to them. This
article is an expansion of a speech presented by the author at the Saint Louis University School
of Law Symposium on “Controlling Waste, Fraud and Abuse; After Health Care Reform” held
on October 23, 2009.
1. Adlai E. Stevenson, Welcome Address to the 1952 Democratic National Convention
(July 21, 2952), in 4 THE PAPERS OF ADLAI E. STEVENSON 11, 13 (Walter Johnson et al. eds.,
1974).
2. ANTONIO SANTI, THE BOOK OF ITALIAN WISDOM 168 (2003).
3. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-33 (2006).
4. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)-(2) (2006) (creating liability for “[a]ny person who—(1)
knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, to an officer or employee of the United States
Government . . . a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval [or] (2) knowingly makes,
uses, or cause to be made or used, a false record or statement to get a false or fraudulent
claim paid or approved by the Government”). See also United States v. Bourseau, 531 F.3d
1159, 1170-71 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1524 (2009) (holding that FCA
includes a materiality element); United States ex rel. A+ Homecare, Inc. v. Medshares Mgmt.
291
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 Whether materiality was an essential element for FCA liability.
 If so, how “materiality” would be defined.
 However defined, how courts would apply this element.

The reason this question is so critical is that materiality is the difference
between innocence and guilt under this quasi-criminal statute.5 Materiality
is not an issue in the run-of-the-mill FCA case. A hospital that bills
Medicare for a “phantom” patient it has never treated is liable under the
FCA and materiality is never considered an issue.6 A doctor who treats a
Medicare patient and then codes the treatment at a higher reimbursement
level is liable under the FCA and materiality is either irrelevant or, more
properly, assumed.7 The issue of materiality is never litigated in these cases
because, under these facts, the violation is obvious—the defendant has
billed the government for services that it has not provided. This is the
essence of a “false claim.”
Materiality is a critical determination, however, for cases based on what
some courts call “legally false” claims.8 (These courts refer to the situations
described in the paragraph above as “factually false” claims.9) Other courts
refer to these as “false certification” cases because some express or implied
certification of compliance has been violated.10 In a case based on a
“legally false” claim, or in a “false certification” case, the defendant has
provided the goods or services to the government or government beneficiary
for the agreed upon price.11 For example, a hospital has provided
medically necessary services to a Medicare eligible beneficiary and billed
the government the proper amount; a defense contractor has provided a

Group, Inc., 400 F.3d 428, 441-42 (6th Cir. 2005) (concluding that false statements or
conduct must be material to the claim in order to hold a violator liable under the FCA); Mikes
v. Straus, 274 F.3d 687, 697 (2d Cir. 2001) (declining to address whether the FCA requires a
materiality element); United States ex rel. Berge v. Board of Tr. of Univ. of Ala., 104 F.3d
1453, 1459, 1460 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 301 (1997) (stating whether FCA
requires a materiality element is a question for the court); Megan L. Hoffman, Comment, The

Substantial Weight Test: A Proposal to Resolve the Circuits’ Disparate Interpretations of
Materiality Under the False Claims Act, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 181, 190 (2009).
5. See Medshares Mgmt., 400 F.3d at 443 (“[L]iability does not arise from merely
making a false statement, but rather from making a false statement to conceal, avoid, or
decrease an obligation owed to the Government. A false statement can only avoid or
decrease an obligation if that statement is material to the money or property owed to the
Government.”).
6. United States ex rel. Conner v. Salina Reg’l Health Ctr. Inc., 543 F.3d 1211, 1217
(10th Cir. 2008); Mikes, 274 F.3d at 697.
7. Conner, 543 F.3d at 1217; Mikes, 274 F.3d at 697.
8. Conner, 543 F.3d at 1217; Mikes, 274 F.3d at 697.
9. Conner, 543 F.3d at 1217; Mikes, 274 F.3d at 697.
10. See Conner, 543 F.3d at 1217-18 (discussing express and implied false certification).
11. Id.
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part that meets all specifications and billed the government for the contract
price; a university has spent federal grant money for the purposes set forth in
the grant.
But—and there is always a “but” in these cases—the hospital, contractor
or grantee has violated some other regulation, statute, contract, or grant
term in the course of delivering that service, producing that article, or
performing the grant. In the case of the hospital, one or more conditions of
participation may have been violated in the course of delivering the
necessary services to the eligible beneficiary.12 The contractor may have
violated a discrimination law in hiring workers for its plant, which the
contract prohibited. In the case of the grantee, an ancillary term of the
grant may have required full compliance with environmental laws, and even
though the grantee performed the work funded by the grant, it otherwise
was not in full compliance with these laws.
In every FCA case of this nature, the question arises: Do these factually
true claims become legally false because of the violation of ancillary legal
requirements? Does the fact that an express (or implied) certification of
legal compliance occurred make an otherwise true claim for money become
false? The answer has, in most cases, depended on the application and
definition of the requirement of materiality. More simply, are the ancillary
violations material to the government’s decision to pay the claim? If the
answer is yes, assuming the necessary knowledge or intent requirement has
been met, the claim is false and the defendant is liable under the FCA. If
no, the claim is not false and the defendant is not liable.
The history and development of materiality under the FCA is a
fascinating case study in statutory construction. Academics and federal
judges have waxed eloquent on whether materiality is required and what it
means.13 To practicing lawyers and their clients, however, this is not an idle

12. Id. at 1220. See also Mikes, 274 F.3d at 697 (stating the most common form of a
false claim is for goods or services not rendered or provided in violation of contract terms,
specification, statute, or regulation).
13. See United States v. Bourseau, 531 F.3d 1159, 1170 (9th Cir. 2008) (discussing that
while the FCA text does not contain a materiality requirement, legislative history indicates it
was Congress’ intent for one to be incorporated); United States ex rel. A+ Homecare, Inc. v.
Medshares Mgmt. Group, Inc., 400 F.3d 428, 442-43 (6th Cir. 2005) (“[U]nder the rule that
Congress intends to incorporate the well-settled meaning of the common-law terms it uses, we
cannot infer from the absence of an express reference to materiality that Congress intended to
drop that element from the fraud statutes” (quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 23
(1999)); Mikes, 274 F.3d at 697 (discussing that a materiality requirement meant that only a
portion of admittedly false claims would be subject to FCA liability); United States ex rel. Berge
v. Board of Tr. of Univ. of Ala., 104 F.3d 1453, 1459 (4th Cir. 1997) (“[W]e now make
explicit that the current civil False Claims Act imposes a materiality requirement.”); see also
Hoffman, supra note 4, at 190 (discussing that circuit courts have found materiality a
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question for law professors and judges. Any provider, contractor, or grantee
dealing with the federal government is subject to such an overwhelming
regime of laws, rules, regulations, and guidelines that full compliance is
impossible. For such entities, should they become the defendant in an FCA
case, materiality is one of two key issues (the other being intent) that renders
an otherwise innocent defendant liable under the FCA.14 Materiality is a
theoretical concept with devastating real-world ramifications—treble
damages and per-claim civil penalties under the FCA—even though the
services or goods were delivered as promised.15
The stakes were raised on May 20, 2009, when the FCA was amended
to make materiality an explicit requirement for liability and to establish a
definition of the term,16 resolving a circuit split that had developed since the
1986 amendments.17 In every crucial liability provision, the term “material”
was added.18 Thus, 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(B) was amended to require that
the knowingly false statement be “material to a false or fraudulent claim.”19
In addition, the reverse false claim provision was amended to require that
the false record or statement be “material to an obligation to pay or transmit
money or property to the Government.”20 The term was then defined in the
manner espoused by the Department of Justice (“DOJ”).21 New Section

requirement of 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a), even though Congress did not make it an express
requirement under the statute).
14. Medshares Mgmt., 400 F.3d at 443.
15. Bourseau, 531 F.3d at 1173.
16. The Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009 (FERA), Pub. L. No. 111-21, §
4(a)(1), 123 Stat. 1617, 1623 (2009) (to be codified at 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(B)).
17. See Bourseau, 531 F.3d at 1170-71 (discussing that the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth,
Eighth and Ninth circuits hold that the FCA includes a materiality element, yet each is still split
on how to measure materiality); Medshares Mgmt., 400 F.3d at 445 (stating that the circuits
that have addressed materiality are inconsistent on its standard to be applied); Hoffman, supra
note 4, at 197-98 (discussing that the Fourth, Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth circuits have applied the
natural tendency test, which states “that a false statement is material if it has ‘a natural
tendency to influence, or is capable of influencing, the decision of the decisionmaking body to
which it was addressed’” (quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 16 (internal quotations
omitted)), while the Second and Eighth circuits have applied the outcome determinate test,
which “requires a showing that the alleged fraudulent actions had the purpose and effect of
causing the United States to pay out money it is not obligated to pay, or those actions which
intentionally deprive the United States of money it is lawfully due” (quoting Medshares Mgmt.
Group, 400 F.3d at 446) (internal quotations and citations omitted)).
18. FERA § 4(a), 123 Stat. at 1621-23.
19. FERA § 4(a)(1), 123 Stat. at 1621.
20. FERA § 4(a)(1), 123 Stat. at 1622 (to be codified at 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (a)(1)(G)).
21. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Plaintiff at 10, United States ex
rel. Heath v. Dallas/Fort Worth Int’l Airport Bd., No. 3:99-CV-0100-M, 2004 WL 1197483
(N.D. Tex. May 28, 2004) [hereinafter Heath Brief] (arguing for the adoption of the “capable
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3729(b)(4) provides that “the term ‘material’ means having a natural
tendency to influence, or be capable of influencing, the payment or receipt
of money or property.”22
Even though materiality is now clearly a requirement with a definition
provided, what has really changed with the 2009 amendments? What do
the phrases “having a natural tendency to influence” and “be capable of
influencing” really mean? How much more vulnerable are FCA defendants
under these amendments? The key to the future, as always, lies in the past.
This history demonstrates how the warnings from the elegant Mr. Stevenson
and the irrepressible Mr. Zappa, quoted above, can apply to FCA
enforcement.
II. HISTORY OF MATERIALITY UNDER THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT

A. Materiality Before the 1986 Amendments
Prior to the 1986 amendments, although the concept of materiality
existed under the FCA, there were few FCA cases expressly discussing it.23
The concept of materiality has its roots in United States v. McNinch, where
the Supreme Court stated that the FCA is “not designed to reach every kind
of fraud practiced on the Government.”24 Prior to the expansion of qui tam
enforcement in 1986,25 most FCA cases brought by the government were
factually false claims.26 The concept that a claim could be false because of
the violation of an ancillary law, regulation, contract, or grant term was not
unknown, but FCA enforcement on this theory was quite rare.27
In most pre-1986 amendment cases, the concept of materiality was
more properly raised as a question of reliance or causation—terms
commonly used interchangeably. For example, in Woodbury v.United
States28 and United States v. Hibbs,29 the courts required the Government’s
of influencing” test); JOHN T. BOESE, CIVIL FALSE CLAIMS AND QUI TAM ACTIONS 2-186 (3d ed.
Supp. 2010-1).
22. FERA § 4(a)(2), 123 Stat. at 1623.
23. See, e.g., United States v. McNinch, 356 U.S. 595 (1958); United States v. Thomas,
709 F.2d 968, 972 (5th Cir. 1983); United States v. Miller, 645 F.2d. 473, 475 (5th Cir.
1981); United States v. Hibbs, 568 F.2d 347, 350 (3d Cir. 1977).
24. McNinch, 356 U.S. at 599.
25. False Claims Amendments Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-562, § 3, 100 Stat. 3153,
3155-57 (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)-(g) (2006)).
26. See Hibbs, 568 F.2d at 351 (discussing that defendant submitted false certifications
to the FHA); McNinch, 356 U.S. at 597 (discussing government’s claim that defendant caused
a bank to submit false applications for insurance to the FHA); Woodbury v. United States, 232
F. Supp. 49, 52 (1964) (discussing government’s claim that plaintiff’s contracts and
applications for payment were false).
27. Woodbury, 232 F. Supp. at 55-56.
28. Id. at 55.
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reliance on the false statement or certification. In those cases (both
involving FCA cases based on criminal convictions), the courts analyzed
reliance and causation as an element of damages—the false certification
had to cause the damages sought by the government.30 This analysis can
also be found in other pre-1986 cases, such as United States v. Miller,31
and United States v. Thomas.32 One of the most well-known false
certification cases decided before 1986 was United States ex rel.
Weinberger v. Equifax, Inc.33 In Weinberger, a qui tam relator claimed that
the defendant submitted false claims to the government because the
defendant, while providing services to the government, had violated the
Anti-Pinkerton Act.34 The court first explained that the purpose of the FCA
was primarily to deal with factually false claims:
The False Claims Act “was not designed to reach every kind of fraud
practiced on the Government.” United States v. McNinch, 356 U.S. 595,
599, 78 S.Ct. 950, 2 L.Ed.2d 1001 (1958). The statute is primarily
directed against government contractors’ billing for nonexistent or worthless
goods or charging exorbitant prices for delivered goods. Id. Equifax plainly
did not submit a false claim under this reading of the statute: no one has
suggested that Equifax’s reporting activities for the government were not
properly carried out. Weinberger has alleged no false claim in this sense.35

The court went on to discuss what other courts would later describe as
legally false claims or false certification cases:
The statute also interdicts material misrepresentations made to qualify for
government privileges or services. See, e. g., Alperstein v. United States,
291 F.2d 455, 456 (5th Cir. 1961) (per curiam) (veteran violated False
Claims Act when, to qualify for federal benefits, he falsely swore that he was
financially unable to bear medical expenses); United States v. Johnson, 138
F.Supp. 525, 52728 (W.D.Okla.1956) (physician misrepresented
competency and general qualifications to gain employment with Air Force).
The principal thrust of Weinberger’s allegations fall into this category: that
Equifax misrepresented its qualification for government employment and
thus made a false claim. But to establish that Equifax committed fraud in
this manner, Weinberger first must demonstrate that the government was
misled by Equifax’s application for the reporting business. Unless the
government made it clear that it would not employ detective agencies when
it contracted for the work, Equifax’s application did not make a material

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Hibbs, 568 F.2d at 350.
Id. at 350; Woodbury, 232 F. Supp. at 55.
United States v. Miller, 645 F.2d 473, 475 (5th Cir. 1981).
United States v. Thomas, 709 F.2d 968, 972 (5th Cir. 1983).
United States ex rel. Weinberger v. Equifax, Inc., 557 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1977).
Id. at 458.
Id. at 460.
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misrepresentation, did not mislead the government, and did not defraud the
government within the meaning of the False Claims Act . . . In this case the
False Claims Act is not an enforcement device for the AntiPinkerton Act.
Weinberger has failed to allege a claim under the False Claims Act.36

Post-1986 concepts of materiality can be traced directly to this decision.

B.

“Materiality” After the 1986 Amendments

The rarity of legally false or false certification cases and the debate over
materiality changed in 1986, when FCA enforcement was transferred from
virtually exclusive control of the DOJ to a shared enforcement with private
attorneys representing qui tam relators.37 While the DOJ has the option to
control all FCA cases, it intervenes and takes control in only about twenty
percent of the cases (where over ninety-five percent of the recoveries
occur).38 The other eighty percent of FCA cases are unintervened cases
litigated by qui tam relators without DOJ control.39 The materiality issue
arose after 1986, mostly in these unintervened cases.40 These were the
legally false cases, where the goods and necessary services were delivered
to the government and eligible government beneficiaries at the prices
agreed to, but some other ancillary violation allegedly occurred, and the qui
tam relator alleged that the claim became false by reason of this violation.41
Why would these legally false or false certification cases rise so
dramatically with the increase in qui tam enforcement? The answer lies in
the different motivations for DOJ enforcement of the FCA and qui tam
enforcement of the FCA. DOJ attorneys (along with those in the U.S.
Attorneys’ Offices) are primarily law enforcement officials. Their motivation
is to root out fraud on the U.S. Treasury, and they have a broader policy
goal.42 The DOJ and its client agencies must balance FCA enforcement
with the government’s responsibility for serving the citizens. As a result,
DOJ’s primary focus is on factually false cases: that is where the true fraud

36. Id. at 461.
37. False Claims Amendments Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-562, § 3, 100 Stat. 3153,
3155 (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(3) (2006)).
38. See BOESE, supra note 21, at H-7 app (As of September 30, 2009, the U.S. has
intervened in 1,266 cases out of a total 6,628 cases.).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 2-167.
41. United States ex rel. Thompson v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 125 F.3d 899,
902 (5th Cir. 1997).
42. See generally BOESE, supra note 21, at 1-11 (discussing the ruling of United States v.
Griswold, 24 F. 361 (D. OR. 1885), “that while the government might release a qui tam
defendant from the damages owed it under the Act it could not release the defendant from
damages due the informer,” the U.S. Treasury).
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occurs.43 A qui tam lawyer, on the other hand, is primarily interested in the
greatest financial recovery for his or her individual client. While qui tam
lawyers prefer factually false qui tam cases because they are easier to prove,
the private relator and counsel are interested in a recovery, and a legally
false FCA case, which is far easier to allege, is better than no FCA case at
all. For this reason, the qui tam relator counsel is much more likely to push
the envelope on materiality issues than the DOJ attorney. They have
nothing to lose.
In these unintervened cases, the question commonly arose: When does
the ancillary violation make an otherwise true claim become false? In
virtually all of these cases the DOJ did not intervene, but only appeared as
an amicus, or friend of the court.44

C. The Initial DOJ Position: Materiality Is Not a Requirement for FCA
Liability
Despite the clear holding in Weinberger, the DOJ position in virtually
every amicus brief after 1986 was that materiality was not a requirement for
FCA liability.45 While the DOJ agreed that there was “something” that
differentiated inconsequential violations from important violations, the
government consistently denied the requirement for materiality.46 Perhaps
the best discussion of the government position is in the panel decision in
United States v. Southland Management Corporation.47 The discussion by
both the panel majority and the dissent (which is one of the best-written FCA

43. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Defendants-Appellees at 1,
Mikes v. Straus, 274 F.3d 687 (2d Cir. 2001) (No. 00-6269) (stating that knowingly billing
the government for services not provided is a “garden-variety” FCA violation). See also
BOESE, supra note 21, at 2-167 (“Prior to 1986, when the FCA was enforced almost entirely
by the Justice Department, most FCA complaints relied on what may be referred to as
‘traditional’ fraud—claims for substandard products, claims based on timecard mischarging,
claims in contracts procured by bribery, etc . . . After 1986, when FCA enforcement was
significantly expanded to affirmatively encourage enforcement by private parties, qui tam
relators (and to a lesser extent the now-expanded Justice Department) began pushing the
application of the FCA beyond the more traditional areas of enforcement. In this new era,
FCA cases began to be based on allegations that claims to the government contained
‘certifications’ (either express or implied) of compliance with other laws, regulations,
guidelines, or standards.”).
44. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs-Appellants, United States
ex rel. Burlbaw v. Orenduff, 548 F.3d 931 (10th Cir. 2008) (No. 60-2006, 05-2393); Heath
Brief, supra note 21; Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Plaintiff-Appellant,
United States ex rel. Thompson v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 125 F.3d 899 (5th Cir.
1996) (No. 96-40868) [hereinafter Thompson Brief].
45. Heath Brief, supra note 21, at 3; Thompson Brief, supra note 44, at 10.
46. United States v. Southland Mgmt. Corp., 288 F.3d 665, 677, 678 (5th Cir. 2002).
47. Id.
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opinions ever) refers to the DOJ position on materiality as unsustainable.48
The dissenting judge, Judge Edith Jones, stated that “the precise definition
of materiality remains open to question in this court based on a government
theory never before accepted by a federal court.”49 Judge Jones later stated
that “the government’s proffered test of ‘claim materiality’ is ingenious but
wrong.”50

D. The “Prerequisite for Payment” Test of Materiality
According to the dissent in Southland, and a number of other federal
courts, the issue was quite simple: Were the false certifications a prerequisite
to government payment?51 Although some courts did not call this a test for
materiality, it was a requirement for liability. The best example of this is
United States ex rel. Mikes v. Strauss, where the court was faced with a
claim by the qui tam relator (the DOJ declined to intervene) that a
healthcare provider had submitted false claims under the theory that services
provided to eligible beneficiaries were “false” because the device used was
not properly calibrated.52 In its famous decision, the Second Circuit held:
We join the Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and District of Columbia Circuits in ruling
that a claim under the Act is legally false only where a party certifies
compliance with a statute or regulation as a condition to governmental
payment.53

Essentially, these courts held that only certifications which actually affected
payment could harm the treasury and, because the FCA was founded upon
harm to the Federal Treasury, a false statement that did not harm the
Federal Treasury could not constitute a violation of the FCA.

E.

The DOJ Acceptance and Redefinition of “Materiality”

The decision in Mikes was a wake-up call for the DOJ. By continuing to
argue that materiality was not a required element of the FCA, the DOJ was
losing the ability to define what was required under the FCA. A few cases,
48. Id. at 678, 692.
49. Id. at 692. The Southland case became a virtual embarrassment for DOJ. After the
panel decision in favor of the government was released, the defendants were granted
reconsideration en banc. United States v. Southland Mgmt. Corp., 307 F.3d 352 (5th Cir.
2002). In the decision that followed, the court of appeals unanimously (including the two
panel judges who favored the government) reversed the panel decision and rejected liability.
United States v. Southland Mgmt Corp., 326 F.3d 669, 677 (5th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
50. Southland, 288 F.3d at 693.
51. See, e.g., id. at 694; Mikes v. Straus, 274 F.3d 687, 698 (2d Cir. 2001); Luckey v.
Baxter Healthcare Corp., 183 F.3d 730, 732-33 (7th Cir. 1999); United States ex rel.
Thompson v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 125 F.3d 899, 902, 903 (5th Cir. 1997).
52. Mikes, 274 F.3d at 693.
53. Id. at 697.
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most notably the Fourth Circuit’s decision in United States ex rel. Harrison v.
Westinghouse Savannah River Co,54 provided the DOJ with a possible
answer. In Harrison, the court found that an organizational conflict of
interest violation was material to the contract, but held that there were no
damages where the government continued to fund the contract after
learning about the conflict.55 The court did, however, affirm the assessment
of penalties, finding that penalties were the proper remedy when FCA
violations had occurred but no damages were proven.56
The DOJ response was to change its language, but not its position. In
an amicus brief for United States ex rel. Heath v. Dallas Fort Worth Airport
Board,57 which followed shortly after the government’s debacle in the
Southland case, the DOJ stated that materiality was a requirement for FCA
liability,58 but it then defined materiality as simply a false certification that is
“capable of influencing” or “has a natural tendency to influence” the
government’s decision to pay the claim.59 The DOJ adopted the following
position on materiality:
[T]he proper standard for determining whether the alleged false statements
in the instant case were material is whether they had the potential or natural
tendency to affect the Government’s payment decision. This inquiry, in turn,
requires the Court to examine the grant provisions with which the relator
contends that the defendant misrepresented its compliance, to determine
whether any of these provisions was a condition of payment. . . .If the
defendant’s false statements are determined to be related to a condition of
payment—and the Government takes no position on this issue—those
statements had a natural tendency to affect the Government’s payment
decision and were therefore material.60

The DOJ’s change in strategy was, for the most part, successful. Courts
began to accept this capable of influencing standard. The Fourth Circuit,
which previously adopted this standard,61 was joined by the Sixth Circuit in

54. Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 352 F.3d 908 (4th Cir. 2003).
55. Id. at 917, 922-23.
56. Id. at 913 (noting that the district court ruled that even though plaintiff failed to prove
actual damages, aggravating and mitigating circumstances allowed for a penalty against
defendant).
57. United States ex rel. Heath v. Dallas/Fort Worth Int’l Airport Bd., No. 3:99-CV-0100M, 2004 WL 1197483 (N.D. Tex. May 28, 2004). (The reader should note that the author
was one of the attorneys representing the defendant in this case.).
58. Heath Brief, supra note 21, at 3.
59. Id. at 4 (citing Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 16 (1999)).
60. Heath Brief, supra note 21, at 13.
61. See Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 352 F.3d 908, 914 (4th Cir.
2003); United States ex rel. Berge v. Board of Trs. of Univ. of Ala., 104 F.3d 1453, 1459 (4th
Cir. 1997).
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United States ex rel. A+ Homecare, Inc. v. Medshares Management Group,
Inc.62 and a number of other courts.63 Others, however, clung to the
position that a false certification had to be a prerequisite to payment for
FCA liability to result.64
III. THE 2009 AMENDMENTS REQUIRE AND DEFINE “MATERIALITY”
When the opportunity presented itself, the DOJ used Congress’s desire
to amend the FCA to settle the dispute over materiality. In 2008, a number
of amendments to the FCA were proposed primarily by qui tam relator
groups lobbying for elimination of certain defenses adverse to qui tam
relator lawsuits.65 The DOJ opposed these amendments, primarily because
the amendments would have allowed government employees, in certain
circumstances, to bring qui tam cases for their own personal benefit.66 The
DOJ Comment Letter to the Senate Judiciary Committee (as well as a later
letter to the House Judiciary Committee) expressed this opposition but stated
that, if Congress wished to amend the FCA, the DOJ had a number of
amendments in mind.67 For the most part, these amendments were
accepted and passed by the Judiciary Committees of both the Senate and
the House, but the bills never reached the floor of either house of Congress
before the session ended.68

62. United States ex rel. A+ Homecare, Inc. v. Medshares Mgmt. Group, Inc., 400 F.3d
428, 445 (6th Cir. 2005).
63. See, e.g., United States v. Bourseau, 531 F.3d 1159, 1171 (9th Cir. 2008); United
States v. Rogan, 517 F.3d 449, 452 (7th Cir. 2008).
64. See Mikes v. Straus, 274 F.3d 687, 698 (2d Cir. 2001); United States ex rel.
Thompson v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 125 F.3d 899, 902 (5th Cir. 1997); United
States ex rel. Hopper v. Anton, 91 F.3d 1261, 1266 (9th Cir. 1996); United States ex rel.
Smart v. Christus Health, 626 F. Supp. 2d 647, 656 (S.D. Tex. 2009); United States ex rel.
Graves v. ITT Educ. Servs., Inc., 284 F. Supp. 2d 487, 496 (S.D. Tex. 2003).
65. See generally False Claims Act Correction Act of 2008, S. 2041, 110th Cong. § 3
(2008); False Claims Act Correction Act of 2007, H.R. 4854, 110th Cong. (2007). See also
S. REP. NO. 110-507, at 9 (2008) (Committee on the Judiciary’s report outlining proposed
amendments of S. 2041); John T. Boese & Michael J. Anstett, Dramatic Changes to the False
Claims Act are No Laughing Matter, METRO. CORP. COUNSEL, Feb. 2009, at 14, 14, available
at http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/pdf/2009/February/14.pdf. (The reader should note
that the author testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee in opposition to these
amendments.).
66. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Comments on Managers’ Substitute Amendment of S. 2041, 12 (2008), available at http://www.ffhsj.com/files/QTam/DOJ%20Comments%20on%20Sub.
%20S.%202041.pdf.
67. Id. at 2-3.
68. Chris Flynn et al., The False Claims Act Correction Act: Key Provisions and
Implications, 12 PAYORS PLANS & MANAGED CARE, Jan. 2009, at 17, 17, available at
http://www.crowell.com/documents/The-False-Claims-Act-Correction-Act.pdf.
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The DOJ proposals, however, became the basis of the 2009
amendments to the FCA found in Section 4 of the Fraud Enforcement and
Recovery Act of 2009 (“FERA”).69 These amendments, in the main, did not
address the concerns of the qui tam lobbyists, but they did address the DOJ
issues. For the first time, these amendments also addressed the issue of
materiality.
As stated above, materiality was added as a specific
requirement in both sections 3729(a)(1)(B) and (G).70 Materiality was
defined in new section 3729(b)(4) as the “capable of influencing” or
“natural tendency to influence” standard, the same standard that the DOJ
has espoused in its amicus briefs.71 That amendment, however, was not
retroactive. It applies only to false claims submitted after May 20, 2009.72
At least one court, however, has used the adoption of the capable of
influencing standard in FERA as a reason to adopt this standard in pre-2009
cases.73 Other courts, even after the amendments, have continued to use
the prerequisite for payment standard.74
IV. THE FUTURE OF THE “MATERIALITY” STANDARD
One would think, in light of the active and vigorous debate over the
proper definition and test for materiality, that decisions would hinge on
whatever standard was adopted. In fact, for the most part, the opposite has
been true. A few examples will demonstrate that.
Materiality is critical to one issue of great importance to hospitals—
whether the violation of a condition of participation renders otherwise
proper claims submitted by a hospital false under the FCA. Two leading
cases have addressed that issue, and both concluded that a violation of a
condition of participation would not, under the facts presented, be material
to the government’s payment decision.75 Both used the capable of

69. FERA, Pub. L. No. 111-21, § 4, 123 Stat. 1617, 1621-25 (2009).
70. FERA § 4(a)(1).
71. FERA § 4(a)(2); Heath Brief, supra note 21, at 4.
72. See FERA § 4(f); United States ex rel. Sanders v. Allison Engine Co., Inc., Nos. 1:95cv-970, 1:99-cv-923, 2009 WL 3626773, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 27, 2009).
73. See United States ex rel. Longhi v. United States, 575 F.3d 458, 470 (5th Cir. 2009)
(applying capable of influencing test to qui tam suit filed in 2002).
74. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Bauchwitz v. Holloman, No. 04-2892, 2009 WL
4362819, at *13 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 1, 2009); United States ex rel. Dillahunty v. Chromalloy
Okla., No. CIV-08-944-L, 2009 WL 3837294, at *4 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 16, 2009).
75. See United States ex rel. Conner v. Salina Reg’l Health Ctr., Inc., 543 F.3d 1211,
1221 (10th Cir. 2008) (holding that perfect compliance is not a prerequisite to receiving
Medicare payments); United States ex rel. Landers v. Baptist Mem’l Health Care Corp., 525 F.
Supp. 2d 972, 979 (W.D. Tenn. 2007) (holding that “[c]onditions of [p]articipation do not
condition payment on certifications of compliance”) (The reader should note that the author
was one of the counsel for the defendant in this case.).
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influencing standard. In United States ex rel. Landers v. Baptist Memorial
Health Care Corp., because the district court was in the Sixth Circuit, it was
bound by the circuit’s holding in A+ Homecare that materiality required
only the capable of influencing standard.76 The court carefully analyzed the
decisions in Harrison and A+ Homecare to determine exactly what the
natural tendency test meant.77 Nevertheless, on a summary judgment
motion in which the court assumed that a standard of participation had
been violated, the court held:
In this case, Plaintiff has failed to satisfy the Sixth Circuit’s materiality
requirement for liability under the FCA. As discussed above, Conditions of
Participation do not condition payment on certifications of compliance.
Therefore, any alleged false certifications of compliance would not have a
natural tendency to influence the Government’s payment decisions.78

A similar decision was issued shortly thereafter by the Tenth Circuit in United
States ex rel. Conner v. Salina Regional Health Center, Inc.79 Again, the qui
tam relator argued that the defendant had submitted false claims to
Medicare because the hospital was in violation of certain conditions of
participation.80 The relator relied upon the language in the cost report
certifying that the hospital was in compliance with the various Medicare laws
and regulations.81 This was rejected both by the district court and the Tenth
Circuit.82 The Tenth Circuit first addressed the nature of this certification:
Although this certification represents compliance with underlying laws and
regulations, it contains only general sweeping language and does not
contain language stating that payment is conditioned on perfect compliance
with any particular law or regulation. Nor does any underlying Medicare
statute or regulation provide that payment is so conditioned. Thus, by
arguing that the certification’s language is adequate to create an express
false certification claim, Conner fundamentally contends that any failure by
SRHC to comply with any underlying Medicare statute or regulation during
the provision of any Medicare-reimbursable service renders this certification
false, and the resulting payments fraudulent.83

The court then addressed the relationship between violations of conditions
of participation and the FCA:

76. Landers, 525 F. Supp. 2d at 979.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. United States ex rel. Conner v. Salina Reg’l Health Ctr., Inc., 543 F.3d 1211 (10th
Cir. 2008).
80. Id. at 1215-16.
81. Id. at 1218-19.
82. Id. at 1216, 1219.
83. Id. at 1219.
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[L]iability [under the FCA] does not arise merely because a false statement is
included within a claim, but rather the claim itself must be false or
fraudulent.” United States ex rel. A+ Homecare, Inc. v. Medshares Mgm’t
Group, Inc., 400 F.3d 428, 443 (6th Cir. 2005). A false certification is
therefore actionable under the FCA only if it leads the government to make
a payment which it would not otherwise have made. See, e.g., United
States ex rel. Hopper v. Anton, 91 F.3d 1261, 1266 (9th Cir. 1996). Or,
put another way, the “false statement must be material to the government’s
decision to pay out moneys to the claimant.84

The court then rejected the relator’s theory of liability:
A brief review of the scheme for managing Medicare participation will
demonstrate that the annual cost report certification does not condition the
government’s payment on perfect compliance with all underlying statutes
and regulations, but rather seeks assurances that the provider continues to
comply with the conditions of participation originally agreed upon. Reading
the FCA otherwise would undermine the government’s own administrative
scheme for ensuring that hospitals remain in compliance and for bringing
them back into compliance when they fall short of what the Medicare
regulations and statutes require.85

Another case that rejected FCA liability under the capable of influencing
test is United States ex rel. Lamers v. City of Green Bay.86 In that case, the
Seventh Circuit was faced with facts that clearly indicated that the City of
Green Bay had misled the federal government on various grant
applications.87 The court referred to the Fourth Circuit’s materiality
holdings, and yet it held that these misstatements by the City were irrelevant
to the funding decision.88 It is almost impossible to believe that those
misstatements would not have been at least capable of influencing the
DOT’s decision to fund the grant, but the court of appeals had no problem
rejecting the FCA claim.89

84. Id. at 1219.
85. Id. at 1220.
86. United States ex rel. Lamers v. City of Green Bay, 168 F.3d 1013, 1019, 1020 (7th
Cir. 1999).
87. Id. at 1015.
88. Id. at 1019.
89. Id. at 1020. In many cases that adopt the “capable of influencing” standard for
materiality, the court, explicitly or implicitly, makes clear that the defendant would have been
liable even under a more stringent standard. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Longhi v. United
States, 575 F.3d 458, 472 (5th Cir. 2009). In Longhi, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
addressed the proper materiality standard for a pre-FERA FCA case. Id. at 468-69.
Influenced by the new definition of materiality, the court decided to adopt the “capable of
influencing” standard, despite previous Fifth Circuit law to the contrary. Id. at 470.
Importantly, however, the court makes clear that the defendant would have been liable
regardless of the definition utilized by stating that
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If a violation of a condition of participation is not, as a matter of law, at
least capable of influencing the decision by the government to pay a
Medicare claim, what is? If lying on a grant application is not capable of
influencing the funding decision, what is? What comes out of these and
many other similar decisions is this: Most rational courts are not going to
allow a miscarriage of justice. Most rational courts are also not going to
allow a defendant to be bankrupted when it provides necessary services to
eligible beneficiaries or when a contractor provides articles that met all the
specifications, just because some ancillary law was broken. If these courts
cannot grant a motion to dismiss or summary judgment, as in Landers,90
Conner,91 and Lamers,92 they will limit the recovery to penalties, as in
Harrison.93 Where there is true fraud—a factually false claim—the court will
find liability regardless of the standard (as in A+ Homecare94 and Longhi95).
The flaw in this approach, of course, is its very randomness. The
avoidance of a true miscarriage of justice relies on judges, at both the
district and appellate levels, creating definitions of “capable of influencing”
and “natural tendency to influence” to avoid the financial disaster foreseen
by the Tenth Circuit in Conner, where it recognized that a strict
interpretation of materiality could “undermine the government’s own
administrative scheme for ensuring that hospitals remain in compliance.”96
Adding the definition of materiality in the 2009 amendments was
intended by the DOJ to eliminate this issue. For the government’s own
sake, one hopes it has not and will not. As the Supreme Court stated many
years ago in McNinch, not every violation results in an FCA violation, and

[t]he Government has also successfully demonstrated [that] Lithium Power’s false
statements were material. As we explained above, the test for determining whether a
false statement is material is whether it has a ‘natural tendency to influence or is
capable of influencing’ the government’s decision-making. We are convinced that
Lithium Power’s false statements had the potential to influence the [Government’s]
decisions to award Lithium Power the SBIR grants . . . . Moreover, in the instant case
we also have the evidence that the false statements actually influenced the decision to
award the Defendants the SBIR grants.
Id. at 471-72.
90. United States ex rel. Landers v. Baptist Mem’l Health Care Corp., 525 F. Supp. 2d.
972, 980 (W.D. Tenn. 2007).
91. United States ex rel. Conner v. Salina Reg’l Health Ctr., 543 F.3d. 1211, 1226 (10th
Cir. 2008).
92. Lamers, 168 F.3d at 1020.
93. Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 352 F.3d 908, 922-23 (4th Cir.
2003).
94. United States ex rel. A+ Homecare, Inc., v. Medshares Mgmt. Group, Inc., 400 F.3d
428, 452 (6th Cir. 2005).
95. United States ex rel. Longhi v. United States, 575 F.3d 458, 472 (5th Cir. 2009).
96. Conner, 543 F.3d at 1220.
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that remains the law.97 Long before materiality was an issue, courts have
been rejecting FCA claims if the false statement or false certification was not
essential—not a prerequisite—to the government’s decision to pay the
claim.98 In earlier decisions it was based on reliance or causation.99 In the
Mikes case, the court specifically stated that it was not relying on
materiality.100 While, for many years, this materiality requirement was used
to reject improper claims, if materiality is no longer available, courts will find
another way to reach the same conclusion.
If courts do not, the FCA will no longer be a statute to remedy fraud
upon the Federal Treasury. Without a direct and causal connection
between the false certification and the false claim, without some type of
prerequisite to payment requirement, the FCA is no longer remedial. It then
becomes a criminal statute and is probably unconstitutional unless enforced
with all the protections of a criminal prosecution.
If the purpose of FERA’s amendment was to effectively eliminate
materiality as an element of FCA liability, one needs to keep in mind Mr.
Stevenson’s warning: “Words calculated to catch everyone may catch no
one.”101 Hopefully, courts will apply the new definition of materiality with
this in mind.

97. United States v. McNinch, 356 U.S. 595, 599 (1957).
98. See United States v. Thomas, 709 F.2d 968, 971-72 (5th Cir. 1983); United States v.
Miller, 645 F.2d 473, 475-76 (5th Cir. 1981); United States ex rel. Weinberger v. Equifax,
Inc., 557 F.2d 456, 460 (5th Cir. 1977).
99. See Miller, 645 F.2d at 475-76; United States v. Hibbs, 568 F.2d 347, 350 (3d Cir.
1977); Woodbury v. United States, 232 F. Supp. 49, 55 (D. Or. 1964).
100. Mikes v. Straus, 274 F.3d 687, 697 (2d Cir. 2001).
101. Stevenson, supra note 1, at 13.

